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Watching Big Brother: A Citizen’s Right 
to Record Police 
By Vincent Nguyen* 
Due to growing technological advances and the ubiquity of 
mobile phones, it has become increasingly common for citizens to 
use these devices to photograph and record events. Though largely 
uncontroversial, when used to record public police activity, some 
citizens have been arrested and charged under state wiretapping 
or eavesdropping statutes. Over time, various circuit courts have 
held that this right to record public police actions is a protected 
activity. Most recently, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court decision, which held that this 
act of recording is unprotected, thereby exemplifying how circuit 
courts are split on the issue. Given the importance and timeliness 
of this issue, this Note agrees with the majority of circuit courts 
and argues that recording public police activity receives 
constitutional protection. Part I discusses the First and Fourth 
Amendment protections surrounding this right to record police 
activity, further supplemented by the common law right to acquire 
information. Part II reviews the current circuit split, providing a 
brief synopsis of the various cases dealing with this issue. Part III, 
siding with the majority of circuit courts, argues that the citizen 
right to record is entitled to constitutional protection and 






                                                                                                             
*  Managing Editor, Fordham Environmental Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Fordham 
University School of Law, 2018; B.A., Loyola University Chicago, 2013. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“I can’t breathe.” 
– Eric Garner 
The now-infamous nearly three-minute video shows the 
escalating interaction between Eric Garner and the police, with 
Garner repeating the phrase “I can’t breathe” eleven times.1 The 
video is difficult to watch for a number of reasons, primarily 
because Garner was later pronounced dead at the hospital.2 While 
the video provides a holistic view of the interaction, some 
unrecorded details are of importance, namely (according to 
witnesses) that police arrested Garner twice that year near the same 
spot for selling untaxed cigarettes, and that Garner flailed his arms 
to resist frisking and avoid detention.3 Though this information 
provides a more comprehensive view of the interaction, these 
events are not necessarily pertinent to the events of Thursday,  
July 17, 2014.4 
If police forbade citizens from recording them while they 
perform their official duties in public, society would remain 
uninformed of such harrowing police interactions. Videos are 
important evidentiary devices because they can provide a complete 
and accurate record of events, including dialogue, body 
movements, and other contextual details. According to the 
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), video “creates an 
independent record of what took place in a particular incident, free 
from accusations of bias, [incorrect testimony], or faulty memory. 
                                                                                                             
1 See ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Eric Garner Put in Chokehold by NYPD Officer – Video, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2014/dec/04/i-
cant-breathe-eric-garner-chokehold-death-video [https://perma.cc/59Z9-SMT4]; see also 
Christopher Mathias, Eric Garner Said ‘I Can’t Breathe’ [Eleven] Times — Now 
Activists Are Making [Eleven] Demands in His Name, HUFFPOST (Dec. 11, 2014), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/11/eric-garner-protests-
demands_n_6308956.html [https://perma.cc/5VAH-TZP9]. 
2 See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-
police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/J47G-M48F]. 
3 See id. 
4 See Ford Fessenden, New Perspective on Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES  
(June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/03/us/2014-12-03-garner-
video.html [https://perma.cc/BN75-U5C3]. 
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It is no accident that some of the most high-profile cases of police 
misconduct have involved video and audio records.”5 Most 
importantly, video recordings, as opposed to witness accounts, do 
not erode over time.6 Eyewitness testimony is fickle, and all too 
often, shockingly inaccurate.7 Furthermore, “[b]ystander videos 
provide different perspectives than police and dashboard cameras, 
portraying circumstances and surroundings that police videos often 
do not capture. Civilian video also fills the gaps created when 
police choose not to record video or withhold their footage from 
the public.”8 In addition to a video’s evidentiary value, video 
recording can assist law enforcement, ranging from Justice 
Department investigations of civil rights violations to exonerations 
of police officers accused of wrongdoing.9 In other words, 
bystander videos can not only protect citizens from inappropriate 
police activity, but also protect police from allegations  
of misconduct.10 
In a recent federal circuit court decision, Akins v. Knight,11 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court 
decision,12 which held that citizens do not have the right to record 
                                                                                                             
5 Filming and Photographing the Police, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-
speech/photographers-rights/filming-and-photographing-police [https://perma.cc/U5Z6-
WQZE] (last visited Jan. 28, 2017) (defending the constitutional right to take 
photographs and video in public and committing itself to defend this right). 
6 See Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007) (describing the 
rapid decline in reliability of memory over time); see also Richard P. Conti, The 
Psychology of False Confessions, 2 J. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT & WITNESS PSYCHOL. 14, 
22–23 (1999) (describing the effect misleading post-event information can have on 
recounting the original information). 
7 See Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 N.E.2d 555, 570 (Mass. 2006) (Cordy, J., 
dissenting) (revealing seventy-seven percent of wrongful convictions were due to 
mistaken eyewitness testimony). 
8 Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017). 
9 See Robinson Meyer, The Courage of Bystanders Who Press ‘Record’, ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/the-courage-of-
bystanders-who-press-record/389979/ [https://perma.cc/9NW9-6HF2]. 
10 See Maya Wiley, Body Cameras Help Everyone – Including the Police,  
TIME (May 9, 2017), http://time.com/4771417/jordan-edwards-body-cameras-police/ 
[https://perma.cc/794Z-WFCG]. 
11 863 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2017). 
12 See id. at 1088; see also Akins v. City of Columbia, No. 2:15-CV-04096-NKL, 2016 
WL 4126549, at *17 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2016). 
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public officials.13 In the lower court decision, the appellant argued 
that he was stopped from filming in a police precinct lobby in 
2011.14 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri referenced an Eighth Circuit decision in declaring that 
“neither the public nor the media” enjoys a right of equal access or 
special First Amendment rights.15 In contrast to the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits16—all of which held that the Constitution guarantees the 
right to film public officials in public settings, sometimes subject 
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions17—the Eighth 
Circuit ruled that citizens have no right to film politicians or police 
in public.18 The Eighth Circuit incorrectly ruled on this matter and 
should align itself with the majority of circuit courts, not only to 
provide uniformity, but also to provide citizens with greater 
protections in accordance with their constitutional rights. 
This Note argues the First Amendment protects the citizen’s 
right to record police officers in public spaces.19 The common law 
right to know information further supports the right to record 
police activity.20 Part I outlines the existing constitutional basis, 
specifically the First and Fourth Amendments, and the common 
law which protects citizens from prosecution when recording 
police activity. The majority of federal circuit courts have held that 
both this constitutional and common law right to record public 
                                                                                                             
13 The circuit court affirmed the district court ruling, see Akins, 863 F.3d at 1088, 
which held that appellant “has no constitutional right to videotape any public proceedings 
he wishes to,” Akins, 2016 WL 4126549, at *17. 
14 See Akins, 2016 WL 4126549, at *17. 
15 Id. (citing Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[N]either the public 
nor the media has a First Amendment right to videotape, photograph, or make audio 
recordings of government proceedings that are by law open to the public.”); see also infra 
notes 145–58 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra Section II.A. 
17 See Stephen Wyse, [Eighth] Circuit Rules No First Amendment Right to Film Police 
in Public, WYSE L. FIRM, P.C. (Aug. 9, 2017), http://wyselaw.com/index.php/2017/08/09/
8th-circuit-rules-no-first-amendment-right-to-film-the-police-in-public/ 
[https://perma.cc/KD4S-XMFN]. 
18 See Akins, 863 F.3d at 1088 (affirming the district court decision that held that 
citizens have no right to film politicians or police in public). 
19 See infra Section I.A. 
20 See infra Section I.C. 
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police activity exists.21 Part II describes how the most recent 
Eighth Circuit decision departs from convention, thus creating a 
split at the circuit court level. This Note asserts that as a result, the 
U.S. Supreme Court should address this issue of public 
significance, and subsequently hold this right to exist. Part III 
establishes that recording is a form of speech, entitled to First 
Amendment protection. This First Amendment designation 
protects the recorder when disseminating the recording in the 
future, and from statutes attempting to criminalize recordings.22 
I. LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR THE RIGHT TO RECORD 
This Part details the constitutional protections afforded to the 
recording of public police actions, further supported by the 
common law right to know information. The First Amendment, in 
conjunction with the Fourth Amendment, protects the citizen’s 
right to record public police actions.23 First Amendment 
jurisprudence suggests there is an affirmative constitutional right to 
gather and receive information on matters of public interest.24 This 
right to access information prohibits federal and state governments 
from interfering.25 In addition, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
indicates that police officers have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy while performing their duties in public, indicating citizens 
can legally record these activities.26 Finally, American common 
                                                                                                             
21 See, e.g., Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 687–90 (5th Cir. 2017); ACLU 
of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 594–602 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 
(2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82–85 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 
212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also infra Section II.A. 
22 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 28–42 and accompanying text. 
24 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). The right to receive information 
about public officials is necessary to inform and enable political discourse in a 
democracy. See id. Further, the First Amendment protects the right to disseminate or 
publish recordings of public significance, even if another party illegally intercepted the 
recording. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 519, 534–35 (2001). 
25 See infra notes 43–55 and accompanying text. 
26 See, e.g., Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 592–95 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2002); Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 905, 906–07 (Pa. 1989); State v. 
Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357–58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); see also infra notes 56–62 and 
accompanying text. 
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law protects the act of recording public police activity, allowing 
citizens to create and inspect public records.27 
A. First Amendment 
Because the First Amendment prohibits the government from 
limiting public information, citizens can record the police 
performing their duties in public.28 The right to gather and receive 
information about public officials informs and enables political 
discourse.29 The nation’s founders prioritized transparency and 
information regarding governmental affairs, because it allowed for 
the election of responsible political representatives.30 In fact, the 
Founding Fathers intended the First Amendment to protect 
discussions of politics and government.31 Recordings are 
commonly used for the preservation and dissemination of 
information, and are “included within the free speech and free 
press guaranty of the First [Amendment].”32 Similarly, the 
Supreme Court recognized that a First Amendment right to gather 
                                                                                                             
27 See infra Section I.C. (explaining how the common law right to know information 
supports recording police activity). 
28 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”). In interpreting the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized the right to receive information and 
ideas. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976); Branzburg 
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). Even though this right is not absolute, newsgathering 
is “entitled to [F]irst [A]mendment protection, for without some protection for seeking 
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.” Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 
848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 808 
(5th Cir. 1982)); see also Davis v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 78 F.3d 920, 928 (5th 
Cir. 1996). Finally, there is “an undoubted right to gather news from any source by means 
within the law.” Turner, 848 F.3d at 688 (quoting Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11). 
29 See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). 
30 See id. Furthermore, “speech and press freedom includes, by implication, ‘some 
protection’ for [individuals] gathering information about the affairs of government[, 
which] is consistent with the historical understanding of the First Amendment.”  
Id. at 599. 
31 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); see also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (this constitutional right reflects our “profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open”). 
32 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). 
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and disseminate public information exists,33 including the public 
activities of police officers. In a quick succession of cases in the 
1980s,34 the Court decided that the First Amendment right to 
access information was tantamount to the right to communicate, 
applying strict scrutiny toward any law trying to circumscribe  
this right.35 
1. Constitutional Right to Gather and Receive Information 
The Supreme Court has held that gathering and receiving 
information is included within the First Amendment’s 
protections.36 In 1969, the Court held the “right to receive 
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is 
fundamental to our free society.”37 Not only do citizens have the 
right to receive information and ideas, but the Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                             
33 Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). This notion is discussed in more 
detail in the next Section. See infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra note 44 and accompanying text. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2417, 2418–24 (1996) (restating briefly the strict scrutiny doctrine and the Supreme 
Court’s method of evaluating restrictions on speech). 
35 Strict scrutiny is the highest level of judicial review that a court employs to 
determine the constitutionality of a law, which applies to content-based speech 
restrictions. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (subjecting 
content-based speech restrictions to strict scrutiny analysis); see also Skinner v. State of 
Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (attesting to the importance with 
which strict scrutiny is applied); Legal Info. Inst., Strict Scrutiny, CORNELL LAW SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny [https://perma.cc/H3EQ-7EVK] (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2017) (“Strict scrutiny is a form of judicial review that courts use to 
determine the constitutionality of certain laws. To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must 
have passed the law to further a ‘compelling governmental interest,’ and must have 
narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest . . . . [This] represents an approach in 
which a presumption of constitutionality is shed in favor [of] more exacting  
judicial review.”). 
36 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (indicating that gathering of information is protected 
by First Amendment and explaining that “without some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated”); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557, 564 (1969) (determining that the First Amendment protects information and ideas); 
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (holding First Amendment 
protections extend to right to receive literature); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82–83 
(1st Cir. 2011). 
37 See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 563 (citations omitted). 
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also recognized the right to gather news and information.38 This 
right to gather news is not limited to members of the professional 
press, but extends to the general public as well.39 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that video recordings are a 
protected medium of speech under the First Amendment.40 
Ultimately, the underlying principles of the First Amendment 
protect discussions of matters of public interest.41 
2. Right of Access 
The right of access is an affirmative right to know information, 
requiring the government to avoid intervening in the acquisition of 
such information.42 However, recognition of this right of access is 
relatively new43: The Supreme Court first acknowledged its 
                                                                                                             
38 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (“There is an undoubted right to 
gather news ‘from any source by means within the law . . . .’” (quoting Branzburg,  
408 U.S. at 681–82 (1972)). 
39 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684 (stating that the press is not afforded any special 
right or “access to information not available to the public generally”); see also Glik,  
655 F.3d at 83–84. 
40 First Amendment speech protections encapsulate audiovisual recordings as speech. 
See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding that movies are a protected 
form of speech); see also ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that freedom of press and freedom of speech necessitate the protection of 
making audio or audiovisual recordings), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012); infra note 
172 and accompanying text. 
41 See Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 689 (2017). The First Circuit 
explained, “[t]he filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, 
including police officers performing their responsibilities, fits comfortably within [basic 
First Amendment] principles.” Glik, 655 F.3d at 82. 
42 See David Mitchell Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 109, 109 (1977); see also Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and 
Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 95, 102–03 (2004) (drawing a distinction between “negative structuralism,” 
which prevents the government from interfering with the dissemination and consumption 
of speech, with “affirmative structuralism,” which requires the government to provide 
access to its proceedings or information in its possession). 
43 The Court held a right to access federal information beginning with Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia in 1980. 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). Conversely, the statutory 
right to access information originates with the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) of 
1966. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). FOIA generally requires federal agencies and 
government-controlled entities to release a record when a member of the public submits a 
request for its release, unless the document falls under an enumerated exemption. See id. 
§ 552(a)(1)(A)–(E) (listing provisions related to certain mandatory disclosures); id. 
§ 552(b)(1)–(9) (listing exemptions to the Act’s disclosure requirements); see also David 
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existence in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,44 
where, after a series of mistrials in a Virginia murder case, the 
judge closed the trial to the public and the media.45 Two reporters 
blocked from accessing the courtroom challenged the judge’s 
actions.46 The Supreme Court held the First Amendment played a 
structural role in requiring an open government.47 Seven of the 
eight justices ruled that the First Amendment guaranteed the press 
and the public a right of access to the government.48 Although the 
case directly concerns the public’s right to attend a criminal trial, 
the opinion’s theoretical implications for the public’s right to know 
are much broader.49 Similar to the rights of association and 
privacy, the right of access is implicitly guaranteed in the 
enumerated rights of the First Amendment.50 
Richmond Newspapers left unclear what standard the lower 
courts should apply when determining whether a presumptive First 
                                                                                                             
C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal 
Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1797 (2008) (“The right of access conferred 
by FOIA could not have been more broadly conceived. It allows ‘any person’ . . . to 
request any record . . . on any subject . . . .”). 
44 See 448 U.S. at 580. After the Richmond Newspapers decision, the Court quickly 
decided three additional First Amendment right of access cases, extending the right of 
access to pretrial hearings, sexual assault trials, and voir dire proceedings. See Press-
Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (extending the right to 
preliminary hearings); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510–13 
(1984) (extending the right to voir dire proceedings); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 610–11 (1982) (extending the right to sexual assault 
trials); see also Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the 
War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 38 (2005). Since the mid-1980s, however, 
the Court has left further development of this doctrine to the lower courts. See Eugene 
Cerruti, ‘Dancing in the Courthouse’: The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a 
New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 263–69 (1995) (discussing the holdings of Globe 
Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. 596, Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. 501, Press-Enter. Co., 478 
U.S. 1, as well as lower court right of access cases). 
45 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 559–63. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. at 580 (holding that the First Amendment guarantees the public’s right to 
attend criminal trials) (Burger, J., plurality op.). 
48 See id. Justice Powell did not take part in the decision. Id. at 581. Justice Rehnquist 
was the lone dissenter. See id. at 604. 
49 See generally Papandrea, supra note 44, at 44–48 (tracking the right to know 
doctrine from its origin in Richmond Newspapers through subsequent case law). 
50 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579–80. Free speech is given enumerated 
protection by the First Amendment, which expressly states “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Amendment right of access attaches. As a result, the Supreme 
Court adopted a two-prong history-and-logic test derived from 
Justice Brennan’s Richmond Newspapers concurring opinion.51 
This inquiry considers two factors: (1) whether the proceeding has 
traditionally been open to the public; and (2) whether public access 
to the proceeding at issue would “play[] a significant positive 
role.”52 If the right of access attaches, the court may only restrict 
access to the proceeding if it determines that there is a “compelling 
governmental interest” which necessitates closure, and that this 
closure is “narrowly tailored” to serve such an interest.53 By 
applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court clearly indicates that 
the public’s First Amendment right of access receives the same 
legal protections as the right to communicate.54 
B. Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment relates to the act of recording police 
activity because it protects an individual against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, thus creating the foundation for privacy 
law.55 The Supreme Court originated this significant body of case 
law from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion56 in Katz v. United 
States, which details an individual’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”57 Though originally in a concurring opinion, subsequent 
                                                                                                             
51 The Court points primarily to the Globe Newspaper decision, specifically, those 
sections of which relied upon Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Richmond Newspapers. 
See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986) (citing Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 605–06 (1982)); Globe 
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605–06 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 
(Brennan, J., concurring)); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597–98 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (concluding with a summation of the history-and-logic test). 
52 See Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 8. 
53 See Press-Enter., 464 U.S. at 510 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07). 
54 See id.; see also Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07. In his Globe Newspaper 
dissent, Justice Burger argued that the right of access should not be treated the same as 
the right to disseminate information or to discuss ideas publicly, and that the court should 
instead ask whether the restriction is “reasonable,” balancing the competing interests of 
access and closure. See 457 U.S. at 615–16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
55 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation  
of privacy). 
56 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
57 See id. Charles Katz used a public pay phone booth to communicate illegal gambling 
bets between Los Angeles, Miami, and Boston. See id. at 348 (majority opinion). The 
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case law adopted this two-prong test to evaluate when a 
governmental intrusion constitutes a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.58 The first prong considers whether a person 
demonstrates an actual “subjective expectation of privacy”;59 and 
the second prong examines whether the “expectation [is] one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”60 The first prong 
is a factual inquiry, while the second prong is a question of law.61 
C. Common Law Right to Know Information 
Americans have a vital interest in acquiring information about 
their government because it fundamentally affects their lives.62 The 
common law right to information “antedates the Constitution.”63 
The general common law right to information is a remnant of the 
English common law that allowed citizens to inspect records.64 
This common law right to know information is measured by 
evaluating the requester’s interests in seeking the information.65 
When reviewing the case law applying this common law right 
in various U.S. courts since the nation’s founding, it is unclear 
precisely what a plaintiff must initially show to trigger a right to 
information.66 Some courts have followed the English rule that 
                                                                                                             
FBI recorded his conversations via an electronic eavesdropping device attached outside 
of the phone booth he was in. See id. Though lower courts convicted Katz on the basis of 
these recordings, he challenged the conviction, arguing that the recordings violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 348–50. 
58 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 592 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) 
(citing United States v. Clark, 22 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
62 See Ivester, supra note 42, at 109–10. 
63 Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993). 
64 See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The 
Supreme Court [has] recognized that [the] English common law right of access was 
transferred to the American colonies.”). For a discussion of the underpinnings of the 
English common law right see, for example, Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750 
(Mich. 1928); State v. Williams, 75 S.W. 948, 958 (Tenn. 1903); State ex rel. Ferry v. 
Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334–36 (N.J. 1879). 
65 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978) (discussing the 
operation of the U.S. common law right to information). 
66 There is a dearth of recent common law right to information cases because various 
FOIA statutes are typically relied on for access, and when the common law right is 
litigated it is usually in the context of judicial records. See Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. 
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requires plaintiffs to show some special need or interest in the 
information before claiming this right.67 However, a substantial 
line of cases have denounced this approach, and held that the 
policies of public access and open government are sufficient 
without any showing of need.68 
While some U.S. courts require a special or proprietary need 
for information before the right exists, both federal and state case 
law require no significant showing of need beyond having an 
actual interest in the information.69 Courts focus on traditional 
American democratic ideals, reasoning that all citizens have a right 
“of free access to and public inspection of public records.”70 In 
Nixon v. Warner [Communications, Inc.],71 “[t]he Supreme Court 
squarely addressed the common law right to information.” 
                                                                                                             
Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 902 (“[T]he growth of the common law has been 
stunted in recent years by the spread of comprehensive disclosure statutes . . . . Since the 
Watergate cases, the common law right of access has been invoked in federal courts with 
some frequency, but still almost always in cases involving access to court documents.”). 
67 See, e.g., Ferry, 41 N.J.L. at 334 (“The documents in question are of a public nature, 
and the rule is that every person is entitled to the inspection of such instruments, provided 
he shows the requisite interest therein.”);] Daluz v. Hawksley, 351 A.2d 820, 823 (R.I. 
1976) (“[T]his court recognizes the common law right of inspection by a proper person or 
his agent provided he has an interest therein which is such as would enable him to 
maintain or defend an action for which the document or record sought can furnish 
evidence or necessary information.” (emphasis in original)); see also Hanson v. 
Eichstaedt, 35 N.W. 30, 31 (Wis. 1887). 
68 See, e.g., Boylan v. Warren, 18 P. 174, 176 (Kan. 1888); Hawes v. White, 66 Me. 
305, 306 (Me. 1876); Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 285 (Mich. 1889); State ex rel. Cole 
v. Rachac, 35 N.W. 7, 8 (Minn. 1887); MacEwan v. Holm, 359 P.2d 413, 417 (Or. 1961). 
69 See, e.g., Daluz, 351 A.2d at 823; see also William Randolph Henrick, Public 
Inspection of State and Municipal Executive Documents: ‘Everybody, Practically 
Everything, Anytime, Except . . . ’, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1108–09 (1977) (noting 
that while many courts have relaxed the interest requirement, “[n]evertheless, absent a 
statute, the requirement of an interest in the document itself generally remains a 
prerequisite to inspection”). 
70 Burton, 44 N.W. at 285; see also Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750 (Mich. 
1928) (“If there be any rule of the English common law that denies the public the right of 
access to public records, it is repugnant to the spirit of our democratic institutions. Ours is 
a government of the people.”); Laurie Romanowich, Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark: 
No Access to Taped Evidence, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 257, 261 (1982) (“[T]he common law 
right, like the [F]irst [A]mendment, creates ‘an informed and enlightened public 
opinion.’” (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc.,  
435 U.S. 589 (1978))). 
71 435 U.S. at 597 . 
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Although the Court ultimately denied the request for information, 
it offered a detailed examination of the common law right to 
information’s historical origin, and affirmed that a common law 
“right to inspect and copy public records and documents” exists.72 
These underlying First and Fourth Amendment principles indicate 
the existing constitutional basis for the citizen’s right to record. 
II. CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE RIGHT TO RECORD 
This Part details the current circuit split regarding the citizen’s 
right to record police officers performing their official duties in 
public. While the majority of circuits addressing this issue held a 
fundamental First Amendment right to record police activities in 
public exists, subject to reasonable restrictions—commonly time, 
manner, and place—the most recent federal circuit to rule on this 
issue reached the opposite conclusion.73 Most circuit courts 
recognize the right as clearly established with the surrounding 
factual circumstances affecting whether this right exists in a 
particular police interaction.74 As such, the average citizen has 
little prior notice of whether their filming is protected by the First 
Amendment. The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits adjudicated cases specifically addressing the right to film 
public police activity;75 whereas the Fourth Circuit only 
commented on this issue in passing.76 In opposition, the Eighth 
Circuit recently held that citizens do not have this recordation 
                                                                                                             
72 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597. 
73 See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding “the right to 
film . . . may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions”); see also 
ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that the police are 
generally permitted to take “reasonable steps to maintain safety and control,” even if they 
have incidental effects on an individual’s exercise of the First Amendment right to 
record), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). 
74 See, e.g., Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting the importance that 
the subject filmed is “police carrying out their duties in public,” which is a factual 
inquiry) (quoting Glik, 655 F.3d at 82). 
75 See e.g., Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 689 (5th Cir. 2017); Alvarez, 
679 F.3d at 594; Glik, 655 F.3d at 82; Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 251 
(3d Cir. 2010); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1995). 
76 See, e.g., Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852, 853 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
2018] WATCHING BIG BROTHER 651 
 
right.77 The following sections detail the relevant factual 
circumstances and holdings of the aforementioned circuits. 
A. Circuits Holding a Qualified Recordation Right Exists 
The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
issued rulings to protect the right of bystanders to record police 
actions in public, subject to reasonable limitations.78 In total, 
“[t]heir collective jurisdictions now amount to exactly half of the 
[United States,] and roughly [sixty] percent of the  
American population.”79 
1. The First Circuit 
In August 2011, the First Circuit Court decided Glik v. 
Cunniffe,80 after many instances of police arresting or charging 
people for recording police under Massachusetts’s wiretapping 
statute.81 In 2007, police arrested Simon Glik for recording the 
arrest of another young man on the Boston Commons park grounds 
on his cell phone.82 After verifying Glik recorded the arrest, one of 
the officers arrested Glik for unlawful audio recording in violation 
                                                                                                             
77 See Akins v. Knight, 863 F.3d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 2017). 
78 See infra Sections II.A.1–6. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607 (determining that 
reasonable orders to maintain safety and control, which have incidental effects on an 
individual’s exercise of the First Amendment right to record, may be permissible); Glik, 
655 F.3d at 84 (exercising the right to film may be subject to reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions). 
79 Matt Ford, A Major Victory for the Right to Record Police, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/a-major-victory-for-the-right-to-
record-police/533031/ [https://perma.cc/6BCX-2RC9]. 
80 655 F.3d 78. 
81 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Manzelli, 864 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) 
(discussing Jeffrey Manzelli, who was convicted for illegal wiretapping and disorderly 
conduct after recording police during a protest on Boston Commons); see also 
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001) (discussing Michael Hyde’s 
prosecution under Massachusetts’s wiretapping statute for recording police during a 
traffic stop); Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cellphone Recordings: Witnesses Taking 
Audio of Officers Arrested, Charged with Illegal Surveillance, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 12, 
2010), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/01/12/police_
fight_cellphone_recordings/ [https://perma.cc/6UWS-XFN7] (describing Jon Surmacz’s 
arrest after recording police breaking up a party). 
82 Glik, 655 F.3d at 79–80. 
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of Massachusetts’s wiretap statute.83 Glik subsequently filed suit, 
claiming the charge violated his First and Fourth Amendment 
rights.84 The First Circuit answered the narrow question of whether 
a constitutional right exists to record police publically performing 
their official duties.85 The court held “though not unqualified, a 
citizen’s right to film government officials, including law 
enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public 
space is a basic, vital, and well-established liberty.”86 The court 
further held that “[g]athering information about government 
officials[,]” which “can readily be disseminated to others,” protects 
and promotes the First Amendment’s goals by “promoting ‘the free 
discussion of governmental affairs.’”87 
On May 23, 2014, three years after Glik was decided, the First 
Circuit again addressed the right to record police in public in 
Gericke v. Begin.88 Carla Gericke, was charged under New 
Hampshire’s wiretapping statute89 after she pretended to record a 
late-night traffic stop of her friend in another vehicle.90 Shortly 
thereafter, she was arrested and charged, and as a result, sued the 
city.91 The First Circuit held that private citizens have the First 
Amendment right to film “police officers performing their duties in 
public.”92 The court extended the holding in Glik regarding an 
individual’s right to film a public police interaction, to also 
                                                                                                             
83 See id. at 80. The Massachusetts wiretapping statute prosecutes any individual who 
“willfully commits an interception, attempts to commit an interception, or procures any 
other person to commit an interception or to attempt to commit an interception of any 
wire or oral communication . . . .” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(c)(1)  
(West 2018). 
84 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 79 (bringing “suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his 
arrest for filming the officers constituted a violation of his [constitutional] rights”). 
85 Id. at 82. 
86 Id. at 85. 
87 Id. at 82 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)); see supra  
notes 37–42 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of gathering and 
disseminating information). 
88 753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014). 
89 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2017). 
90 Gericke, 753 F.3d at 2–3. 
91 Id. at 3–4. 
92 See id. at 7. A traffic stop, regardless of the additional circumstances, is still a public 
police act. See id. at 7. Therefore, “a traffic stop does not extinguish an individual’s  
right to film.” Id. 
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encompass a citizen’s right to record to traffic stops.93 However, 
the court approved of future reasonable restrictions when justified 
by the circumstances.94 
2. The Third Circuit 
The two plaintiffs in Fields v. City of Philadelphia,95 Richard 
Fields and Amanda Geraci, filed lawsuits that led to the Third 
Circuit’s ruling, though their claims originated because of two 
separate incidents.96 In September 2012, Geraci filmed officers 
arresting a protester during an anti-fracking demonstration.97 
During the filming, “[a]n officer abruptly pushed Geraci . . . 
against a pillar,” which effectively “prevented her from . . . 
recording the arrest.”98 In 2013, Fields used his iPhone to 
photograph “police . . . breaking up a house party across the 
street.”99 An officer arrested Fields and searched his phone.100 
Though neither plaintiff was charged, both filed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims, alleging the individual police officers, and by extension the 
City of Philadelphia, violated their constitutional rights.101 Because 
of the similarity in their claims, the court consolidated their suits 
for discovery, dispositive motions, and trial.102 
                                                                                                             
93 See id. at 7–8. The First Circuit held that “First Amendment principles apply equally 
to the filming of a traffic stop and the filming of an arrest in a public park.” Id. at 7. “In 
both instances, the subject of filming is ‘police carrying out their duties in public.’” Id. 
(quoting Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011)). In doing so, the court 
extended Glik: “[I]t is clearly established in this circuit that police officers cannot, 
consistently with the Constitution, prosecute citizens for violating wiretapping laws when 
they peacefully record a police officer performing his or her official duties in a public 
area.” Id. at 5. 
94 See id. at 8 (finding “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops, particularly when the 
detained individual is armed, might justify a safety measure—for example, a command 
that bystanders disperse—that would incidentally impact an individual’s exercise of the 
First Amendment right to film”); see also supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
95 166 F. Supp. 3d 528 (E.D. Pa. 2016). Notably, the district court’s opinion contains a 
more detailed factual record and analysis than the Third Circuit. See generally id.; see 
also infra note 96 and accompanying text. 





101 Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
102 See id. at 528. 
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The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
held the plaintiffs did not have the First Amendment right “to 
observe and record police officers absent some other expressive 
conduct,”103 citing the lack of Third Circuit or Supreme Court 
precedent.104 The court noted that because neither plaintiff spoke 
during the incidents, their act of recording would only be protected 
if understood as expressive conduct.105 The court declined to 
expand First Amendment protection to the act of observing and 
recording, finding there was no “authority compelling this broad a 
reading of First Amendment precedent.”106 Accordingly, the court 
declined “to create a new First Amendment right for citizens to 
photograph officers when they have no expressive purpose such as 
challenging police actions.”107 Fields and Geraci appealed the 
ruling to the Third Circuit, which rejected the lower  
court’s reasoning.108 
The Third Circuit disagreed with the lower court, holding the 
First Amendment protects citizens recording public police 
activity.109 In its ruling, the Third Circuit emphasized the 
importance of “[a]ccess to information regarding public police 
activity,” also alluding to the importance of the First Amendment 
in the discussion of governmental affairs.110 However, the Third 
Circuit also upheld the First Circuit’s imposition of  
reasonable restrictions.111 
                                                                                                             
103 Id. at 533. 
104 See id. at 534–35 (noting the Third Circuit “has never held speech unaccompanied 
by an expressive component is always afforded First Amendment protection”). 
105 See id. at 535–37. 
106 Id. at 535. 
107 Id. at 542. 
108 See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]his case is 
not about whether Plaintiffs expressed themselves through conduct. It is whether they 
have a First Amendment right of access to information about how our public servants  
operate in public.”). 
109 Id. at 355–56. 
110 See id. at 359. 
111 See id. at 360 (“We do not say that all recording is protected or desirable. The right 
to record police is not absolute. ‘[I]t is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.’” (quoting Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010))); 
see also supra note 73. Time, place, and manner restrictions are the typical restrictions 
that a court applies to the act of recording, see supra note 73 and accompanying text, 
however, discussion of these restrictions is outside the scope of this Note. 
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3. The Fifth Circuit 
In 2017, the Fifth Circuit addressed citizen surveillance of 
police officers in Turner v. Lieutenant Drive.112 While standing on 
public property, the defendant, Phillip Turner, attempted to record 
a police station when two officers approached him and asked him 
to identify himself.113 After Turner refused to provide his 
identification, he was arrested.114 At the precise point of his arrest, 
the Fifth Circuit held Turner did not have the “clearly established” 
right to record police activity, thereby entitling the officers to 
qualified immunity.115 However, the Fifth Circuit held this right 
exists moving forward,116 affirmatively holding that citizens have 
the right to record police officers performing their public duties.117 
The court, referring to the decisions of other circuits, agreed that 
the right to film police promotes First Amendment principles, but 
opined that the right was subject to similar limitations, such as 
time, place, and manner restrictions.118 
4. The Seventh Circuit 
In 2012, in American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. 
Alvarez,119 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the right to record police 
in public.120 At issue was a statute enacted by the Illinois General 
Assembly in 1961 criminalizing the use of electronic devices 
which could “record all or part of any oral conversation without 
[the] consent” of the speakers.121 The law was subsequently 
“amended . . . to require the consent of ‘all of the parties’ to the 
                                                                                                             
112 See 848 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 2017). 
113 Id. 
114 See id. (“Turner asked the officers whether he was being detained, and Grinalds [one 
of the officers] responded that Turner was being detained for investigation and that the 
officers were concerned about who was walking around with a video camera. Turner 
asked for which crime he was being detained, and Grinalds replied, ‘I didn’t say you 
committed a crime.’ Grinalds elaborated, ‘We have the right and authority to know who’s 
walking around our facilities.’”). 
115 Id. at 685. 
116 See id. at 687–90. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 689. 
119 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). 
120 See id. at 608. 
121 Id. at 587. 
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conversation.”122 Here, the ACLU, a civil liberties organization, 
filed a pre-enforcement action against the State of Illinois, 
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief to bar enforcement of 
the eavesdropping statute.123 
The ACLU proposed a police accountability program to better 
hold law enforcement officials accountable for their actions.124 
This plan included plans to publish recordings of police officers 
speaking at an audible volume while performing their duties in 
public.125 Based on its familiarity with the statute, and before 
implementation of the plan to collect recordings, the ACLU filed 
the pre-emptive suit against Alvarez to protect their videographers 
from prosecution.126 The Seventh Circuit recognized that a 
citizen’s right to record police activity is protected via “the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and press rights,”127 after 
extensively reviewing the First Amendment jurisprudence.128 The 
Seventh Circuit held the Illinois eavesdropping statute burdens 
individual speech and free press rights, based on “the expansive 
reach of the statute[;]”129 and concluded by granting a preliminary 
injunction to prevent its application against the ACLU and  
its agents.130 
                                                                                                             
122 Id.; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/14-2(a)(1) (2012). 
123 See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. at 586. 
127 See id. at 595 (finding that “[a]udio and audiovisual recording are media of 
expression commonly used for the preservation and dissemination of information and 
ideas” and are therefore protected by the First Amendment’s free speech and free  
press rights). 
128 See id. at 589, 595–603. The court of appeals noted at the outset that the State of 
Illinois had staked out an “extreme position,” rejecting the notion that openly recording 
the speech of police officers while they performed their duties in public was not protected 
by the First Amendment. See id. at 594. 
129 Id. at 595 (noting “the statute sweeps much more broadly, banning all audio 
recording of any oral communication absent consent of the parties regardless of whether 
the communication is or was intended to be private” (emphasis in original)). 
130 See id. at 608. 
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5. The Ninth Circuit 
In Fordyce v. City of Seattle,131 the Ninth Circuit reversed a 
grant of summary judgment to police officers who allegedly 
assaulted a marcher who attempted to film police interference with 
a public protest.132 On August 5, 1990, Jerry Edmon Fordyce, a 
participant in the protest, attempted to videotape the public march 
“presumably for broadcast on a public access channel.”133 Though 
recording the overall protest, Fordyce also recorded the activities 
of police officers monitoring the protest.134 When “attempt[ing] to 
videotape sidewalk bystanders,” Fordyce was arrested for violating 
a Washington privacy statute.135 Because Fordyce’s appeal was 
based on an alleged assault and battery incident, the Ninth Circuit 
did not engage in a thorough discussion of the First Amendment 
right to record police.136 However, the court briefly noted the 
existence of the right to record matters of public interest (i.e., the 
police in a public setting), albeit in dicta.137 
6. The Eleventh Circuit 
In 2000, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that a broad First 
Amendment right to photograph or videotape police exists.138 
James and Barbara Smith sued the City of Cumming, Georgia 
alleging that the police prevented Mr. Smith “from videotaping 
police actions.”139 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Georgia granted summary judgment for the city.140 However, 
the court of appeals reversed, holding that “[t]he First Amendment 
protects the right to gather information about what public officials 
do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of 
public interest.”141 Though the opinion is short, the Eleventh 
                                                                                                             
131 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995). 
132 See id. at 438, 442. 
133 Id. at 438. 
134 Id. 
135 Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (2017) (forbidding the recording of 
private conversations without the consent of all participants). 
136 See Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 438–42. 
137 See id. at 440. 
138 See Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
139 Id. at 1332. 
140 See id. 
141 Id. at 1333. 
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Circuit recognized the First Amendment right to record police, 
similarly subject to reasonable restrictions.142 Nonetheless, the 
court dismissed the complaint, determining that the Smiths failed 
to prove the police officers had violated that right based on the 
facts alleged in the complaint.143 As stated by the majority of 
circuit courts, the First Amendment protects recording of police 
activity not only as a form of expressive activity, but also in 
support of First Amendment principles by promoting the 
discussion of governmental affairs.144 
B. Eighth Circuit Holding Recordation Right Does Not Exist 
Most recently, the Eighth Circuit, in Akins v. Knight, upheld a 
lower court ruling that citizens do not have a First Amendment 
right to videotape the police or any public official in public.145 
Matthew Akins of Columbia, Missouri claimed the local police 
department retaliated against him after multiple attempts to record 
police activity.146 While videotaping the encounters, Akins 
typically stood on public property, such as a street or sidewalk.147 
Based on previous interactions with the police, Akins formed a 
group called Citizens for Justice in 2010, which aimed to 
document and report on police activity.148 Akins regularly 
videotaped police activity and posted the videos onto the Missouri 
police department Facebook website on several occasions.149 In 
                                                                                                             
142 See id.; see also supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
143 See Smith, 55 F.3d at 1333. 
144 See supra Sections II.A.1–6. 
145 See 863 F.3d 1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (affirming grant of summary 
judgment motion to dismiss complaint on constitutional grounds). 
146 See Akins v. City of Columbia, No. 2:15-CV-04096-NKL, 2016 WL 4126549, at 
*16–17 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2016). 
147 See, e.g., id. at *7. 
148 See Akins, 863 F.3d at 1085; Akins, 2016 WL 4126549, at *6. Akins founded the 
technology-based “interactive community resource” based on his frustrations with local 
police officers. See Brad Racino, Citizens for Justice Keep Watchful Eyes on  
Columbia Police Department, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Feb. 13, 2012), 
https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/citizens-for-justice-keep-watchful-eyes-on-
columbia-police-department/article_895281f4-a37e-5f8a-9c14-be38f26747a9.html 
[https://perma.cc/A6ZP-G5A5]. Previous encounters with law enforcement officers 
solidified Akins’s belief that many police officers often overstepped their authority. See 
id. Thus, Akins founded this organization to not only hold police accountable, but also to 
support local activism in police reform. See id. 
149 See Akins, 2016 WL 4126549, at *8. 
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2011, Akins was in the police department lobby and attempted to 
film a person wearing a Ku Klux Klan hood.150 While filming, he 
was instructed to stop and ultimately complied.151 Approximately 
four years later, “[i]n October 2015, the Police Department held an 
invitation-only ‘Media Training Day,’” only inviting traditional 
media members due to space limitations.152 Despite not receiving 
an invitation, Akins attempted to RSVP to the event, but organizers 
informed him that he was not invited and could not attend.153 
Akins filed suit against Boone County Prosecutor, Dan Knight, 
and several Columbia police officers, citing violations of his First 
Amendment right, among other miscellaneous claims.154 The U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Missouri ruled that 
Akins, and by extension, any citizen or member of the traditional 
press—i.e., individuals representing traditional media 
organizations—have no right to record the activities of public 
officials on public property.155 Akins appealed the decision, 
arguing that the district court judge should have recused herself 
from the case, and the lower court erred in “granting the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss and for summary judgment.”156 The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.157 In affirming 
the lower court’s decision, the Eighth Circuit also affirmed the 
district court’s finding that Akins had no right to film  
police activity.158 
                                                                                                             
150 See id. at *7. 
151 See id. 
152 Id. at *8. 
153 See id. 
154 See Akins v. Knight, 863 F.3d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir. 2017). 
155 See Akins, 2016 WL 4126549, at *17 (finding Akins “has no constitutional right to 
videotape any public proceeding he wishes to”); see also id. (“[N]either the public nor the 
media has a First Amendment right to videotape, photograph, or make audio recordings 
of government proceedings that are by law open to the public.” (citing Rice v. Kempker, 
374 F.3d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 2004))). 
156 Akins, 863 F.3d at 1086. 
157 See id. at 1088. 
158 See id.; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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III. PROPOSAL FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF 
THE CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO RECORD 
Whether it intended to or not, the Eighth Circuit decision 
contradicts other circuit courts by holding that the right to record 
police officers in public does not exist.159 Considering the 
importance of this right, especially in relation to the underlying 
First Amendment cornerstone of free discussion of governmental 
affairs, the Supreme Court must overrule any lower court decision 
endangering this right. Without this right, citizens in the Eighth 
Circuit are stripped of an important mechanism to hold the police 
accountable for their activities. Section III.A proposes that the act 
of video recording official public police activity qualifies as 
speech, thereby entitling it to First Amendment protections.160 
Section III.B explains that because of this constitutional protection, 
citizens have the right to disseminate these recordings.161 Finally, 
Section III.C explains that the societal benefits far outstrip the 
potential negative consequences of these recordings.162 
A. Act of Recording Amounts to Speech Triggering First 
Amendment Protections 
The First Amendment protects video recordings because 
“conduct is necessary to produce speech,”163 and courts have 
“increasingly recognize[d] that the antecedent process of speech 
                                                                                                             
159 See supra Part II. 
160 See infra, Section III.A. 
161 See infra, Section III.B. 
162 See infra, Section III.C. 
163 Clay Calvert, The Right to Record Images of Police in Public Places: Should Intent, 
Viewpoint, or Journalistic Status Determine First Amendment Protection?, 64 UCLA L. 
REV. DISCOURSE 230, 241 (2016). The Supreme Court has recognized some First 
Amendment protection for the speech process, and not merely the expressive end 
product. See infra notes 166–78 and accompanying text. First Amendment jurisprudence 
separates speech from conduct. See Randall P. Bezanson, Is There Such a Thing as Too 
Much Free Speech?, 91 OR. L. REV. 601, 601 (2012) (emphasizing that the First 
Amendment guarantee of free speech traditionally “has rested on two fundamental 
boundaries: speech versus conduct and liberty versus utility”); Martin H. Redish, Fear, 
Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic Skepticism and the Theory of Free 
Expression, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 691, 700 (2015) (addressing “the fundamental distinction 
between speech and conduct”). 
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creation” deserves protection.164 The Ninth Circuit in Anderson v. 
City of Hermosa Beach confronted the issue of First Amendment 
protections for alternative conceptualizations of speech.165 In 
Anderson, Johnny Anderson, a tattoo artist, attempted to open a 
tattoo parlor in Hermosa Beach, California, a city with a pre-
existing municipal ordinance effectively banning tattoo parlors.166 
Anderson alleged that the ordinance violated his First and Fourth 
Amendment rights167 The Ninth Circuit reasoned: 
Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever 
drawn a distinction between the process of creating 
a form of pure speech (such as writing or painting) 
and the product of these processes (the essay or the 
artwork) in terms of the First Amendment 
protection afforded. Although writing and painting 
can be reduced to their constituent acts, and thus 
described as conduct, we have not attempted to 
disconnect the end product from the act  
of creation.168 
The Ninth Circuit thus concluded that the First Amendment 
protected the entire process of tattooing—beginning with the act of 
creation—as a form of expressive activity.169 Because little to no 
time lag exists between the act of pushing the record button “and 
the result[ing] image[,]” the First Amendment—similar to 
tattoos—protects video recordings as a form of expressive activity, 
from its moment of creation.170 No legal difference exists 
separating the unprotected act of recording from the speech it 
immediately produces.171 
                                                                                                             
164 Calvert, supra note 163, at 241. See, e.g., Buehrle v. City of Key West, 813 F.3d 
973, 978 (11th Cir. 2015); Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 870 (Ariz. 2012). 
165 See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1055 (noting that the case is one of first impression, 
involving the First Amendment protections for tattoo parlors). 
166 See id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 1061–62 (emphasis in original). 
169 See id. at 1060 (“The tattoo itself, the process of tattooing, and even the business of 
tattooing are not expressive conduct but purely expressive activity fully protected by the 
First Amendment.” (emphasis in original)); see also Calvert, supra note 163, at 234. 
170 See Calvert, supra note 163, at 234. 
171 See id. 
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently viewed film 
as deserving of First Amendment protections.172 Therefore, the 
First Amendment protects the act of making film, as “there is no 
fixed First Amendment line between the act of creating speech and 
the speech itself.”173 Because recording the police activity is 
necessary for the film’s creation, the First Amendment protects this 
prior act of recordation.174 If the preliminary act of recordation was 
unprotected, the accompanying First Amendment rights of 
publication or broadcast would be essentially valueless.175 Within 
First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has rejected 
narrow definitions of “speech” or “press,” finding both terms to be 
expansive given the importance of this right in American 
society.176 Perhaps most significantly, the Supreme Court found 
that in the absence of these broader surrounding rights, specifically 
enumerated rights would be more vulnerable.177 If the First 
Amendment failed to protect the recording of public police actions, 
                                                                                                             
172 Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Kingsley 
Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) (“[T]he First 
Amendment’s basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas. The State, quite simply, 
has thus struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty.”); Superior Films, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Ohio, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(“Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than the public speech, 
the radio, the stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First Amendment draws no 
distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas.”); Burstyn v. Wilson, 
343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[W]e conclude that expression by means of motion pictures is 
included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First . . . Amendment[].”). 
173 Turner, 848 F.3d at 688–89 (quoting ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 596 
(7th Cir. 2012)); see also Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596 (citing Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061–
62), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). 
174 See Calvert, supra note 163, at 243. 
175 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595 (“The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is 
necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights 
as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording. The right to publish or 
broadcast an audio or audiovisual recording would be insecure, or largely ineffective, if 
the antecedent act of making the recording is wholly unprotected . . . .”  
(emphasis in original)). 
176 See Calvert, supra note 163, at 244; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text 
(explaining the concept of penumbral rights); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 482 (1965) (“The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to 
utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, [and] the right to read.”). 
177 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83; see also Calvert, supra note 163, at 244. 
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the very existence of the resulting images, and free speech by 
proxy, would be threatened as well.178 
B. Right to Disseminate Recordings of Police Activity 
Citizens can disseminate recordings of police activity because 
any interference would constitute an unconstitutional restraint on 
speech.179 In N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court 
criticized interfering with the dissemination of information.180 As 
discussed above, such restraints on dissemination relate to the prior 
act of recording public police activity. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Black noted the Founding 
Fathers sought to prevent the government from censoring the press 
to prevent the government from abusing its power.181 In the age of 
constant connectivity and the twenty-four-hour news cycle, 
citizens recording and disseminating such information functions as 
the same check on government abuse as traditional news outlets.182 
However, because an overarching presumption of 
unconstitutionality remains,183 essentially any restriction on 
disseminating information is presumptively invalid. 
C. Laws Negatively Impacting the Citizen’s Right to Record  
Are Unconstitutional 
The First Amendment prevents the government from restricting 
speech based on “its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”184 Therefore, laws attempting to limit the citizen’s right 
to record affect constitutionally protected speech rights. Statutes 
                                                                                                             
178 See Calvert, supra note 163, at 244. 
179 See Jacqueline G. Waldman, Note, Prior Restraint and the Police: The First 
Amendment Right to Disseminate Recordings of Police Behavior, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
311, 343–45 (2014). 
180 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam). 
181 See id. at 717. If the press is not “free and unrestrained,” it cannot “effectively 
expose deception in government.” Id. See also Waldman, supra note 179, at 322. 
182 See id. at 324–26, 333. 
183 See id. at 323; see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“Our cases, it is true, have indicated that there is a single, extremely narrow class of 
cases in which the First Amendment’s ban on prior judicial restraint may  
be overridden.”). 
184 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 603 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. 
ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). 
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that impose liability on citizens recording police action impede 
speech by restricting the “use of common instruments of 
communication.”185 Regulating the use of a recording device in 
regard to a particular subject (i.e., police officers) “suppresses 
speech just as effectively as restricting the [later] dissemination of 
a recording.”186 Criminalizing the recording of police interactions 
“necessarily limits” later access to that information, inevitably 
impinging on First Amendment rights.187 Accordingly, if a statute 
“interferes with the gathering and dissemination of information 
about [police officers] performing their duties,”188 it is subject to 
strict scrutiny as a result of its impact on First Amendment 
principles.189 Laws that restrict speech based on its content are 
facially invalid; therefore, the burden shifts to the government to 
overcome this presumption of unconstitutionality.190 
                                                                                                             
185 Id. at 600 (“In short, the eavesdropping statute restricts a medium of expression—
the use of a common instrument of communication—and thus an integral step in the 
speech process. As applied here, it interferes with the gathering and dissemination of 
information about government officials performing their duties in public. Any way you 
look at it, the eavesdropping statute burdens speech and press rights and is subject to 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
186 Id. at 596. 
187 See id. at 597. 
188 Id. at 600. 
189 See id. at 603. The Alvarez court stated that “[u]nlike the federal wiretapping statute 
and the eavesdropping laws of most other states, the gravamen of the Illinois 
eavesdropping offense [was] not the secret interception of surreptitious recording of a 
private communication.” Id. at 595. The court reasoned that the statute did not 
sufficiently advance the State’s interest in protecting conversational privacy. See id. at 
606. Instead, the court held the Illinois statute was much broader, banning “all audio 
recording of any oral communication absent consent of the parties regardless of whether 
the communication is or was intended to be private.” Id. at 595 (emphasis in original). 
The court concluded that “[t]he expansive reach of th[e] statute [wa]s hard to reconcile 
with basic speech and press freedoms.” Id. The court rejected the State Attorney’s 
argument that the broad sweep of this statute was legitimized by the government’s 
interest in protecting conversational privacy, noting that this interest was not implicated, 
and the application of the statute would likely fail even under a relatively lenient 
intermediate standard of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral burdens of speech.  
See id. at 586–87. 
190 See id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)). 
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D. Police Officers Performing Their Official Duties in Public 
Have No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The Katz test applies to police officers in evaluating whether 
police officers have a privacy interest when performing their duties 
in public.191 The test, so applied, functionally collapses into a 
single inquiry: can a police officer reasonably expect his public 
actions will not be recorded?192 If police officers are found to 
possess this requisite privacy interest, their activities would be 
protected from recording.193 
As a matter of law, most public interactions with police 
officers lack a reasonable expectation of privacy.194 This 
diminished privacy expectation is anchored in Katz, such “that 
knowing[ly] expos[ing] a conversation to the public is tantamount 
to . . . surrender[ing its] constitutional protection.”195 In fact, courts 
have generally concluded that people conversing in open and 
public spaces have no objective privacy expectation.196 Of utmost 
importance, the Court held that communications during traffic 
stops—comparatively a smaller and more contained interaction—
are akin to open and public conversations, and thus, may receive 
no justifiable Fourth Amendment protection.197 
                                                                                                             
191 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(enumerating what would come to be adopted as the Katz test, and providing that a 
“person,” which would include a police officer, has a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
192 See, e.g., Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 592 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2002) (applying the Katz test to police officers). 
193 See id. 
194 See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984); Kee v. City of Rowlett, 
247 F.3d 206, 217 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001); Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 593. 
195 Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for 
Safeguards in State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record 
Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 487, 516–17 (2011). See Katz,  
389 U.S. at 351. 
196 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); see also 
Kee, 247 F.3d at 217 n.21; Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1100, 1113–14 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(finding “[t]he right of privacy . . . may be surrendered by public display”); Hornberger, 
799 A.2d at 593. 
197 See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437–38; see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 
(1970). In Chambers, the Court held that individuals usually lack an objective 
expectation of privacy in an automobile because cars are exposed to the public. See 
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48. Additionally, vehicles can be moved quickly and therefore it 
is not practical to require officers to secure a warrant. See id. 
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Additional factors also weigh against an objective privacy 
expectation for police.198 Because police must later report their 
official communications, any privacy expectation is necessarily 
diluted.199 Under Katz, an officer’s duty to accurately report his 
actions—whether at trial or elsewhere—creates exposure, thereby 
eliminating any privacy right the officer may have against 
recordation.200 Furthermore, witnesses to a police interaction “are 
regularly called into court to repeat or testify about the 
encounter.”201 Thus, under Justice Harlan’s Katz two-part test, a 
police officer in public has no reasonable expectation of privacy.202 
As detailed by numerous courts, police officers, in the public 
performance of their duties, have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.203 “[T]he public interest in detecting, punishing, and 
deterring crime” outweighs the privacy rights of police officers 
acting in their official law-abiding capacity.204 Therefore, police 
officers in public lack the requisite privacy interest to qualify for 
protection under state and federal wiretapping statutes.205 
E. Benefits of Recordings Trigger Protection 
Numerous arguments support citizens recording police activity. 
Recordings of police activity can provide probative evidence in 
criminal cases, ensure civil rights claims are properly upheld, and 
allow the public to hold the police accountable.206 
                                                                                                             
198 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
199 Kee, 247 F.3d at 214 (listing six nonexclusive factors to evaluate subjective 
expectation of privacy which include, inter alia, “the potential for communications  
to be reported”). 
200 See id. at 214–15. 
201 See Alderman, supra note 195, at 516–17. 
202 See Kee, 247 F.3d at 215 (summing up a framework of factors for the Katz test 
applied to officers that implicates a dearth of reasonable privacy expectations). 
203 See id.; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 905, 
906–07 (Pa. 1989); Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2002); State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357–58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
204 See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 598–600 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972). 
205 See Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 595; see also Henlen, 564 A.2d at 907; Flora, 845 
P.2d at 1358. 
206 Alderman, supra note 195, at 525–26. 
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1. Video Evidence Provides Probative Evidence in  
Criminal Cases 
“[I]t is increasingly common for dispositive evidence in 
criminal trials to come from common mobile devices.207 However, 
wiretapping statutes pose a dangerous problem in states that 
prohibit . . . recording.”208 Wiretapping statutes would effectively 
suppress video or audio evidence instead of providing additional 
evidence relevant for the prosecution or defense.209 State laws that 
bar recordings would then hinder the prosecution of police officers, 
even if the misconduct could have been captured on tape.210 
Unfortunately, if a statute criminalizes third-party recording, police 
officers could charge the civilian recorder, and escape 
accountability in the event of wrongdoing.211 In other words, 
criminal trials might exclude “exculpatory evidence collected in 
violation of wiretapping statutes,” preventing “true justice” from 
being served.212 By allowing citizens to record, the potential 
evidentiary value for trial will benefit society by helping to convict 
guilty parties and assist in the exoneration of innocent individuals. 
2. Vindication of Civil Rights in Section 1983 Claims 
Laws preventing police officers from being publicly recorded 
effectively exempt law enforcement from liability, even though 
                                                                                                             
207 See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Recorded on a Suspect’s Hidden MP3 Player, a Bronx 
Detective Faces [Twelve] Perjury Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/nyregion/07cop.html  
[https://perma.cc/DAB9-PN7T]. 
208 Alderman, supra note 195, at 526; see, e.g., supra notes 121–30 (noting the ACLU’s 
perceived need for a preliminary injunction against such a statute before commencing a 
police accountability program); see also Project Veritas Action Fund v. Conley, 244 F. 
Supp. 3d 256, 259 (D. Mass. 2017) (holding one such law from Massachusetts 
unconstitutional (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (West 1968))). 
209 See Alderman, supra note 195, at 526; see also supra note 208 and  
accompanying text. 
210 See generally Alderman, supra note 195, at 525–30 (providing examples of 
incidents where video evidence proved to be uniquely probative). 
211 See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971–72 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., 
dissenting) (“[H]ad police beaten Rodney King in Massachusetts” (prior to the holding in 
Conley, 244 F. Supp.3d at 259), “it might have been George Holliday, the recorder, rather 
than the four abusive officers, charged in the aftermath of the incident,” with his crime 
being “‘secretly’ recording police without consent.”). 
212 Alderman, supra note 195, at 527. 
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Congress enacted section 1983 to provide citizens with legal 
recourse if their constitutional rights were infringed upon.213 
However, Section 1983 claims are civil, requiring the plaintiff to 
allege that they have suffered a constitutional deprivation by a 
preponderance of the evidence.214 Given the potential impact of 
video and audio recordings, such evidence should be admitted 
when, otherwise, it might be excluded from being added to the 
evidentiary record.215 
The Supreme Court has admitted the value of such recordings, 
finding videos to create a near perfect evidentiary record, even in 
preliminary court proceedings.216 In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme 
Court dismissed a section 1983 action, which alleged a law 
enforcement official intentionally drove his car into the suspect’s 
car for the purpose of arrest.217 The legal issue concerned whether 
the intentional collision violated the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment right of freedom from “unreasonable seizure.”218 
Although the appellate court is required to view the facts “most 
favorable to the non-moving party,”219 Justice Scalia found an 
“added wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape 
capturing the events in question.”220 The Court stated that when a 
recording contained applicable and dispositive proof, the fact 
finder should incorporate this evidence into its ruling.221 Justice 
Scalia considered the value of this video evidence to be 
particularly probative, arguing that “[t]he Court of Appeals should 
not have rel[ied] on [the plaintiff’s] visible fiction,” rather, the 
lower court “should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by 
                                                                                                             
213 See id. at 528; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (creating a private right of action 
for persons whose constitutional liberties are violated by persons acting under color of 
state law). 
214 See Alderman, supra note 195, at 529. 
215 See generally Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (concerning a motorist who 
brought a section 1983 claim against police officers for allegedly using excessive force, 
in a case where a police recording was essentially dispositive). 
216 See id. at 380–81. 
217 See id. at 374–76. 
218 Id. at 375–76. 
219 Id. at 380; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
220 See Harris, 550 U.S. at 378. 
221 Id. at 380–81 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 586–87 (1986)). 
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the videotape.”222 The overall benefit of allowing citizens to record 
police activity helps create reliable video evidence, and thus, 
would support a Supreme Court decision finding this right to exist. 
3. Need for Symmetry and Police Reform 
Symmetry of power dynamics must exist between police 
figures and the general public, “which favor recordation of 
custodial interrogations, confessions, and . . . field stops from 
cameras mounted on patrol cars.”223 In the United States, police 
reform advocates have successfully encouraged lawmakers to 
require confessions, interrogations, and identifications to be 
recorded.224 In addition, some jurisdictions have voluntarily 
introduced systemic recordings for the range of interpersonal 
interactions to comply with social norms.225 This increased power 
balance between police forces and the general public further 
supports the finding of the First Amendment right to record  
police activity. 
Recording police activity can bring about cohesion and 
solidarity between police forces and the public, which would create 
a positive net benefit to society.226 The impact of distrust between 
police officers and society is significant, resulting in decreased 
compliance with and trust of law enforcement.227 It is possible to 
build trust through transparent information sharing.228 
Transparency not only minimizes distrust of law enforcement but 
also allows for increased cooperation in civil society.229 For wider 
society to trust the government and police, citizens must be 
allowed to communicate their experiences and share information, 
instead of being criminalized for attempting to exercise this free 
                                                                                                             
222 Id. 
223 Alderman, supra note 195, at 525–26. 
224 Id. at 530–31. 
225 Id. 
226 See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 
YALE L.J. 2054, 2083 (2017); see also Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 
1107, 1120–31 (2000) (describing the democratic bases for increasing availability of 
governmental information about policing). 
227 See Luna, supra note 226, at 1158–60. 
228 See id. at 1163. 
229 Id. at 1159–60, 1163–64. 
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speech right.230 If police interactions follow official guidelines and 
rules, data and transparency can further solidify the relationship 
between officers and communities.231 
CONCLUSION 
Fundamental and practical evidentiary value exists in 
recordings of public police activity. Any government ability to 
prevent recordings of its own activities or suppression of a 
citizen’s innocence is deeply problematic. Moreover, recordings of 
encounters between civilians and law enforcement often produce 
reliable evidence, which can increase trust in the criminal justice 
system. Given this issue’s importance, in addition to the impact on 
the First and Fourth Amendments, the current circuit split requires 
intervention from the Supreme Court. The Founding Fathers’ 
emphasis on free speech and resulting protections afforded to it 
reflect its importance in American legal jurisprudence. Therefore, 
as the majority of circuit courts have stated, the First Amendment 
protects civilians’ right to record police officials performing their 
duties in public. This constitutional classification not only protects 
the recording in future dissemination but also protects the 
recording from statutes trying to infringe upon this right. Further, 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence indicates police officers have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy when publicly performing their 
official duties. Finally, courts should strictly scrutinize any 
regulatory statute attempting to interfere with this right to record to 
promote the exercise of free speech and transparent democracy. 
                                                                                                             
230 Id. at 1164. 
231 See id. at 2144. See generally Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria 
Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & SOC’Y  
REV. 103 (1988). 
